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ABSTRACT

Abstract: Sunset laws are laws designed to limit the size of state government by
providing a process whereby statutorily created programs, agencies and bureaus
are reviewed cyclically and their effectiveness assessed. Possible sunset results
include continuation of the status quo, a reorganization or consolidation with
other state agencies or agency termination. These programs exist in 30 states and
use four distinct approaches, reflecting the confusion associated with the
purpose and effects of such programs. This paper utilizes state expenditure and
employment data to isolate the effects of sunset laws in general and the effects of
each of the four different versions of these laws. I find that states that utilize
sunset programs reduce spending at the state level, while increasing the level of
government services provided. This increase in the efficiency of providing
government services appears to be from the oversight of bureaucrats by the
legislature, rather than from closures of obsolete agencies, and is therefore most
strongly associated with comprehensive sunset programs, which conduct a
greater volume of reviews.
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THE EXPENDITURE EFFECTS OF SUNSET LAWS IN STATE GOVERNMENTS

INTRODUCTION:
There are many different mechanisms that have been devised over the last 40
years with the expressed purpose of limiting or controlling government
spending at the state level. Examples of such legislative restraints include
balanced budget rules, tax and expenditure limits, Governor term limits and lineitem veto power, and the effectiveness of these laws has been widely studied1.
Starting in 1976, in Colorado, a new mechanism appeared on the landscape;
sunset laws. The paper attempts to determine the effectiveness of these laws in
their stated purpose of controlling government spending.
Sunset laws first appeared on the political scene as the result of lobbying by
the Colorado chapter of Common Cause, a citizen’s advocacy group. The stated
goal of these laws has been to promote “good government” by placing an
expiration date on government agencies, boards, committees and commissions.
As this expiration date nears, these governmental entities are subject to a review
in which the bureaucrats at each entity are responsible for justifying their
existence to the legislature in order to continue their existence. At the conclusion
Abrams and Dougan (1986), Crain and Miller (1990), Endersby and Towle (1997), Besley and
Case (2003)
1
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of this review process the sunset boards, populated by state legislators, make
recommendations on the future of the reviewed entity. Suggestions can range
from a continuation of the status quo to some form of reorganization or
consolidation to elimination of the program, agency or board in question. Sunset
laws are unique in that their default position, in the absence of a sunset review, is
the discontinuation of the entity.
Colorado was the first state to adopt sunset laws, but the idea was a
politically popular one, spreading quickly to as many as 36 states by 1981. By
1981, the effectiveness of these laws at actually delivering the savings promised
began to be called into question. In some states, few agencies were being retired
and many questioned where the resources spent in conducting these reviews
were worth the cost, given the lack of tangible results. As a result of this debate,
the spread of sunset programs abated, and in that same year, North Carolina
became the first state to “sunset” its sunset law, starting a trend that would see a
dozen states drop their sunset laws by the beginning of the 1990s. From 1990 to
today, the total number of states using Sunset laws has remained fairly constant,
with a small increase in the past few years.
Today, the states that use sunset laws take four distinct approaches:
comprehensive, regulatory, selective and discretionary review. Comprehensive
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review sunset states require all statutory agencies to be subject to a sunset review
within a designated cycle. The length of the sunset cycle varies from state to
state. Delaware and Ohio have the shortest cycle (4 years), while Texas has the
longest (12 years). Regulatory review only sunset states focus exclusively on
regulatory and licensing agencies and bureaus. States with selective or
discretionary review sunset provisions seek to reduce the time and expense
associated with sunset reviews by concentrating only on agencies selected
through legislative or committee recommendations. Figure 1 provides a more
complete look at the use of sunset provisions across the U.S. states over the past
30 years and Table 1 provides a comparison of the states were that using sunset
in 1981 versus 2005.
Today, 30 states have sunset laws, but the debate surrounding their
effectiveness remains. In this paper, I investigate the question of whether sunset
laws affect government spending and the cost of providing government services.
Using evidence from state government expenditures and employment data, I
find that states that utilize comprehensive, regulatory or selective sunset
programs generate lower levels of expenditures at the state level. At the same
time, those states also offer a greater level of services – measured in terms of the
number of full-time equivalent employees on the state payroll. The combination
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of lower expenditures and higher levels of services provided suggests that the
cost of providing government services in these states has decrease. The evidence
suggests that these gains appear to be more closely related to the oversight of
bureaucrats provided by the sunset process rather than from a larger volume of
agency closures.

SUNSET LAWS:
The origin of the idea for sunset laws can be traced back to Thomas Jefferson,
who said that “every law naturally expires every 19 years2” (which was
considered to be a generation at that time), and to John Adams, whose Sedition
Act of 1798 was written so that it expired once he left office.
Sunset laws at the state level were initially designed to apply to professional
and occupational licensing organizations, advisory boards and commissions. As
sunset laws grew in popularity, they quickly evolved, with the first change being
that states began to apply the sunset concept to all statutory agencies. By the end
of 1978, seven states adopted “comprehensive” sunset laws,3 which require that
all entities created by the legislature be subject to a sunset review once per
review cycle.
2
3

Mooney, pg. 2
See Table 2 for more details about the specifics behind the original Sunset program
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A typical sunset hearing requires the bureaucratic agency to invest a
significant amount of time and resources into documenting the accomplishments
of the agency since the last such review. Estimates of the time dedicated to
preparing for these review range from a few hundred hours to several thousand
hours for larger agencies4. The actual review process also consumes the time of
the legislators on the review board, and is open to the public, allowing interested
parties to become involved in the process. This likely subjects the process to
additional lobbying from interested groups. Early criticism of sunset laws is
divided between the potential wastefulness of having so much time dedicated to
the process and the increased lobbying activity of special interest groups.
The sunset concept also can apply to specific pieces of legislation. For
example, a ban on handguns can be written with an expiration date in it, in order
to force a review of the statute after a given amount of time. Several states5 allow
such provisions for individual laws, despite not having an official sunset statute
in place, and these clauses are not uncommon at the federal level as well. For the
purposes of this study, these states are not considered to be sunset states.

Lyons and Freeman, pg. 153
California, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Virginia
4
5
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Other legislative oversight vehicles are available to state governments which
were designed to promote efficiency. These include tax and expenditure limits,
line item veto, term limits, balanced budget amendments and more. Much
research has been done regarding the effectiveness of such measures and most
studies agree that such institutions do matter. Poterba (1997) and Besley and
Case (2003) offer extensive reviews of this literature. Sunset laws are unique in
that they have a “forcing mechanism,” in the form of the termination dates,
which compels the legislative body to act. If the legislative body shirks its duties
under any of the traditional expenditure control mechanisms, the status quo is
retained, and no oversight has taken place. Under sunset, if a review is not
conducted, the default position is that the agency, laws or program in question
expires. In other words, the status quo is altered, giving the affected party a
strong incentive to ensure the review does take place.

LITERATURE REVIEW:
There is an extensive literature on the effects of legislative and congressional
restraints and their effects on the level of spending in state government. But to
date, none of this literature has included sunset laws in its analysis. What does
exist regarding sunset laws typically was written during the early days of sunset
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and by and large does not address the topic empirically, choosing instead to offer
insights from anecdotes and survey responses. I will briefly review this coverage
and then move into the literature on legislative and congressional restraints.
Adams and Sherman (1978) provide a positive assessment of the possibilities
for sunset to provide more efficient government. However, the authors worked
for Common Cause, the citizen’s activist group influential in getting the first
sunset laws introduced, so their enthusiasm is understandable. The purpose of
the paper was clearly to spread the word about sunset laws and the ten “Sunset
Principles,” first laid out by Common Cause as enumerated in Table 2. Within
these initial guidelines is an acknowledgement that sunset would need to evolve
from its origins in order to be an effective tool and this has proven to be true.
Overall, the focus of the paper is on promoting the sunset agenda, and its timing
allowed for no data to be considered in its analysis.
Hamm and Robertson (1981) look at factors that affect the adoption of new
legislative oversight methods like sunset and rule and regulation review. They
find that factors like high legislative turnover and split control of the legislative
and executive branches lead to greater adoption of both of these means of
legislative oversight. Hamm and Robertson do not address the costs and benefits
of the adoption of such measures, simply the likelihood that they are adopted.
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Lyons and Freeman (1984) and Curry (1990) offer case studies of the sunset
process within a specific state. Lyons and Freeman look at Tennessee, which
uses a comprehensive sunset statute, and therefore reviews all statutory agencies
in a 6-year cycle. Their empirical findings are limited to the response from a
questionnaire sent to Tennessee legislators, but these results suggest that agency
officials are “more conscious of legislative authority.”6 The sunset process is not
seen by bureaucrats or legislators as an antagonistic one, but rather as increasing
opportunities for bureaucrats and legislators to work together. Curry
investigates sunset in Texas, which had a comprehensive sunset law7 with a 12year review cycle at the time of Curry’s study (although it has since been
modified to a selective statute). Curry offers no empirical support for his
arguments, but through anecdotal evidence he offers a mildly positive
assessment of sunset (despite his concerns about the impact of increased
lobbying that accompanies the sunset program).
The most extensive survey available regarding sunset is by Kearney (1990),
who looks at the sunset experience throughout the United States. Kearney finds
that after a period of rapid adoption of sunset laws, the tide of public opinion
apparently turned against sunset. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that no
6
7

Lyons and Freeman, pg. 156
With a few exceptions, like state colleges
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additional states added sunset laws from the early 1980s to the time at which his
paper was published, while several states retired their sunset entirely or
modified their initial statutes during that period. Based on this trend, Kearney’s
conclusion is that sunset is an ineffective mechanism for limiting the size of state
government. To this he adds anecdotal evidence of some of the odd results
associated with sunset8, but does not offer any empirical assessments of the costs
and benefits of the sunset programs.
Other individuals have looked at sunset clauses on individual laws. An
example of this is Mooney (2004) who discusses the use of sunset clauses by the
Bush administration to ease the passage of controversial or tightly contested
legislation. Recent examples of laws that got passed with sunset provisions
include the Patriot Act (aspects set to expire in 2005 were renewed) and the Bush
tax cuts (set to expire in 2010 and 2013). But experience indicates that these laws
are unlikely to come off the books. In each of these examples, the sunset
provisions were included to aid the passage of the initial law. For example, the
Bush tax cut in 2003 would have been subject to a supermajority requirement of

For example, as of Kearney’s survey in 1990, Florida had terminated 90 agencies through
Sunset, but created 104 new ones.
8
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60 votes under the Byrd rule.9 Senator Charles Grassley, a supporter of the
proposed cuts, astutely attached a sunset provision that potentially would
discontinue these tax cuts one day shy of 10 years. This removed the
supermajority requirement of the Byrd rule and consequently the tax cuts passed
58-33. Within days of this passage, Republicans in the Senate introduced
legislation to make these tax cuts permanent, as they had done in the early days
of the Patriot Act. So the sunset provisions that assisted in the passage of these
laws faced immediate challenges.10 Mooney uses this to conclude that the
presence of a sunset clause may increase the likelihood that a law is passed.
The literature on constitutional and legislative restraints attempts to assess
the effect of barriers to spending (like tax and expenditure limits or balanced
budget amendments) and alterations to the balance of power in state government
(like the line item veto power or gubernatorial term limits) on state spending.
Poterba (1997) attempts to consolidate all the evidence on balanced budget laws,
both from the federal and state levels, and offers an extensive review of the
literature regarding the effectiveness of these laws. While not every paper he
examines comes to the same conclusion, Poterba concludes that these rules do

Bills that affect government revenues beyond a 10 year timeframe are subject to a supermajority
requirement in order to pass
10 Mooney, pg 70
9
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make a difference on the level and growth rates of spending in the states that use
them, though not every program necessarily decreases spending.
One of the papers that Poterba cites which does not agree with Poterba’s
conclusion that these institutions matter is Abrams and Dougan (1986). They
look at the effects of constitutional restraints like balanced budget rules, limits on
spending and taxation, line-item veto and gubernatorial term limitations on
spending at both the state and local levels. Following Becker (1983), Abrams and
Dougan model a market where the equilibrium level of taxes and spending is
established by competition from various pressure groups. In this equilibrium,
the value of providing benefits to these groups comes in the form of support for
the candidate who provides the service (or opposition to his opponent). The
costs are in the need for increased spending, and therefore taxes, which will
increase the incentive for opposition from those opposed to higher taxes.
If the various constitutional restraints on spending or taxation do nothing to
affect the marginal benefits from providing government services or the marginal
costs of raising the revenue required, they are attempting to enforce outcomes in
this market that are deviations from the equilibrium outcome. With the market
out of equilibrium, one should expect to find that individual actors will follow
their individual incentives, leading the market back to the equilibrium levels of
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taxes and spending. In other words, such restraints, if they do not alter the costs
and benefits faced by the politicians in the market, should not lead a different
outcome, like lower levels of spending and taxation.
Abrams and Dougan find that while gubernatorial term limits do appear to
have a negative effect on spending by the state government, once local spending
is included, this effect disappears. The other three constitutional restraints,
including balanced budget amendments, do not appear to have any effect on the
level on state spending.
Holtz-Eakin (1988) explores the effect of the Governor’s ability to use a lineitem veto on the size of state expenditures. The author acknowledges that the
power to veto a part of a bill rather than the whole bill alters the relative power
of the executive and legislative branches in a state, but he finds that the line-item
veto does not have a significant effect on the size of state budgets. Holtz-Eakin
uses a variety of dependent variables to proxy for the demand for public goods,
but does not take into account other constitutional constraints on spending like
balanced budget amendments, tax and expenditure limits and, of course, sunset
laws. He does incorporate the distribution of power by political parties, since his
theory on the changing relative power of the executive and legislative branches
requires that the governor veto will hold.
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Rowley, Shughart and Tollison (1988) follow an interest group approach to
politics in analyzing deficit formations from McCormick and Tollison, where the
bureaucratic organization is treated as an input in the production function of
government transfer to interest groups. Politicians provide a brokering function
in a market where the demanders of government services are the smaller, well
organized groups who can effectively lobby for services and the suppliers are the
larger, more diffuse groups who cannot effectively organize. They provide the
transfers, but at a political cost for the brokers. Politicians therefore balance
bargains against costs at the margin and establish a market for political wealth
transfers.
Zax (1989) looks at the effect of citizen initiative and referendum power on
the level of state spending. He finds that placing the power to effect policy in the
hands of the citizenry though vehicles like initiative and referendum increases
the level of spending by those state governments. This conclusion runs counter
to Matsusaka (2004) who uses a cross-sectional approach on a much broader
sample of data and concludes that initiative and referendum adds efficiency to
the process of government, lowering combined expenditures from state and local
government.
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Crain and Miller (1990) also look to address the effects of various
constitutional constraints on the growth in state spending. They attempt to deal
with changes in the behavior of both the executive and legislative branches based
on not only the various constraints they face, but potential interactions between
these various constraints. For example, in a state where a binding constitutional
balanced budget rule is in place, the line item veto becomes relatively less
important. Crain and Miller also take a closer look at differences in particular
constraints across states. Specifically, a rule like the line item veto will generate
different outcomes in states where item-reduction is allowed than those that do
not.11 Using these enhanced definitions of numerous budgetary restrictions in an
ordinary least squares regression on cross-sectional data, Crain and Miller find a
significant negative effect on the growth of state spending to rules like item
reduction veto and supermajority requirements for tax increase where many
other papers results were either mixed or inconclusive.
Alt and Lowery (1994) also look at the role of fiscal institutions like
restrictions on debt and limitations on revenue generation like supermajority
voting rules for tax increases in the determination of state government budgets.
They also consider the political party distribution within the legislative and
Item reduction means that the governor is allowed to write in a number that is lower than the
one suggested in the budget instead of rejecting the item outright.
11
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executive branches and the effect of united and divided parties on the response
to short term disruptions in expected tax revenues, and find these political
factors to be significantly more important than any of the fiscal institutions.
They conclude that the level of spending in a state depends on partisan
preferences, past histories of spending and party control and other exogenous
variables but do not find a significant effect from debt restrictions or
supermajority voting requirements on their own.
Shadbegian (1996) looks at the effect of tax and expenditure limits (TEL) on
the size and growth of state budgets. Shadbegian uses state and time fixed
effects and a term that interacts a TEL dummy and per capita income in the state
because most state tax and expenditure limits do not prohibit increases in
spending, but instead they link growth in state government to growth in income
within the state. He finds that the inclusion of this interactive term yields a
strong negative effect of TEL on the growth of state government expenditures.
Endersby and Towle (1997) look at the impact of constitutional and legal
controls on two measures of state expenditures; per capita spending and per
capita debt accumulation. In addition to attempts to ascertain the effects of items
like the line item veto and debt and deficit limitations, Endersby and Towle
expand the analysis to include a political dimension. Since tools like the line
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item veto certainly alter the balance of political power by adding to the power of
the executive branch, the authors reason that the real effects from such restraints
are likely to be affected by the level of conflict between the executive and
legislative branches. They find that the restraints themselves have no significant
effects on either per capita spending or debt, but that political variables, like a
unified executive and legislative branch, do appear to have a significant negative
impact on the level of debt in those states.
While the question they raise is an interesting and well taken one, Endersby
and Towle use a very limited sample of data (just three budget cycles) and do not
appear concerned with balanced budget amendments in drawing their
conclusions.
Knight (2000) investigates the effects of supermajority voting requirements
for tax increases, again using a panel data set from the U.S. States. He tries
multiple specifications to address the endogeneity of the process by which the
states that have adopted such laws make that decision. He finds that, counterintuitively, pro-tax regimes are usually the ones that adopt supermajority voting
requirements. He develops a model where moderates in the pro-tax party form
an alliance with the anti-tax majority in order to set up barriers to the extreme
pro-tax legislators in increasing taxes.
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The result is that, despite the fact that states with such restrictions have the
same tax rate as those that do not, once one accounts for the pro-tax nature of
these states that have adopted these rules12, there is a negative and significant
effect on tax rates in states that do have these laws.
Another attempt to consolidate all of the research on constitutional and
legislative restraints is Besley and Case (2003). They compile an extensive survey
of the existing empirical work on such limitations and then utilizes a political
framework in order to better assess the environment into which these various
constraints enters. So in addition to the policy making institutions that many of
the above works have concentrated on and that this paper will concentrate on,
Besley and Case introduce electoral institutions, like who can run for office, who
can vote and restrictions on the costs of voting, as well. They agree with
Matsusaka’s finding that initiative and referendum generates lower spending.
Outgoing governor who are prevented from running again by the presence of a
term limit are associated with lower expenditures, as they are lot as likely to
endorse wasteful programs that serve a special interest necessary for reelection.
Besley and Case’s model also predict that fiscal institutions are likely to be moot
in expenditure determination, as these rules are difficult to enforce and
The majority of states that adopted a supermajority voting requirement did so under a
Democratic controlled legislature or Governorship.
12
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politicians are often quite resourceful about finding ways around the letter of the
law. Like Abrams and Dougan, they find no effect from the line item veto. Nonbinding limits on deficits are not surprisingly, ineffective. Besley and Case do
find that tax and expenditure limits are positively associated with state spending
levels, but that supermajority voting requirements tend to yield lower levels of
spending.

THE EVIDENCE:
In order to test the effect of constitutional and legislative restraints on the size
of state governments, much of the previous literature focuses on the effect on the
expenditures of the governments that implement such measures.
Following Rowley, Shughart and Tollison, I envision a market where the
bureaucrats are simply agents for the brokers (the politicians) and as such are
merely an input in the production process for government services (transfers).
To determine the effect of sunset, it is necessary to determine the effect of the
adaption of a new “technology” into this production process on the price of these
political goods. The adoption of any technology involves accepting a cost, with
the expectation that this cost will be more than offset by the resulting efficiency
offered by the innovation. If the costs outweigh the benefits, there is a decrease
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in supply from the organization who adopted the new technology. The resulting
increase in the price of the commodity decreases the equilibrium quantity in the
market, but the effect on expenditures is determined by the elasticity of demand
in the market. The opposite effects are expected if the benefits from the
efficiency gained by the adoption of the new technology outweigh the costs of
implementation. The equilibrium quantity of the good increases, and again the
effect on expenditures is determined by the elasticity of demand.
Such is the case with sunset laws. There is no question that there are costs
associated with these laws. These costs include some direct and obvious costs,
like the cost of setting up the sunset review board and their support team. The
Texas Sunset Advisory Commission acknowledges direct costs of $25 million
from 1982 to 2007, but this only accounts for the administrative costs of running
the commission. It does not take into account the time spent by legislators on
sunset reviews or the time and resources spent by the agencies being reviewed
on sunset reviews. Costs of this type would be highest in the states where the
most reviews are conducted. So states with comprehensive review should face
the highest costs from time and resources spent on reviews. Selective or
discretionary states attempt to limit this type of expense by review only agencies
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that are deemed to need this type of oversight. Those states should experience
the lowest levels of these administrative costs and lost time.
Another criticism of sunset is that it “[puts] targeted agencies on notice and
activated their latent lobbying power.”13 Agencies that could face sunset reviews
will have an incentive to try to avoid the process, as it could conceivably result in
restrictions of the typical operations of the agency or even the elimination of the
agency. Those who enjoy the protection of the targeted agency will engage in
typical rent seeking behavior in order to avoid this fate. Additionally, once the
review process begins, there is certainly lobbying that occurs in an effort to
influence the outcome. Sunset laws typically provide for the inclusion of the
“public” into the process by soliciting input prior to the review and by allowing
testimony during the review process.
Rent seeking behavior of this sort is wealth destroying, and represents a
different type of cost than the ones described above. These lobbying costs are
likely higher in states using selective or discretionary sunset, and these processes
involve the extra step of deciding which agencies will be reviewed – which
provides another margin upon which interested parties can lobby. In
comprehensive and regulatory sunset states, no agencies or programs can avoid

13

Kearney, pg. 50
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the process. Lobbying certainly still occurs, in an effort to influence the eventual
recommendations of the sunset board, but the scope of this lobbying is limited by
the removal of the selection process.
What benefits can be expected from sunset reviews? The most obvious is the
elimination or consolidation of boards, agencies or programs that have either
become obsolete or in some other way demonstrated themselves to be inefficient.
Again referring to statistics from the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission, they
report a savings of over $750 million over their 25-year existence. But not every
state reports the volume of closures and consolidations that Texas has
experienced. Arizona reports no agency terminations between 1981 and 1985.
Other states indicate that sunset has actually led to the creation of new agencies.
Examples include Colorado, where a podiatry board was spun off from an
existing medical board, and even Texas, which added the Board of Irrigation and
a Water Commission as the result of sunset reviews.14
Sunset programs often continue in states even when few entities are being
discontinued. Proponents of the system point to studies like those by Lyons and
Freeman, Curry, and Kearney which indicate that feedback from the legislators
about sunset is generally favorable. Even in states where few agencies actually

14

Kearney, pg. 53
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are dissolved, the lawmakers feel they have a greater ability to oversee the
actions of these entities than they did without sunset reviews. There is a sense
that there is greater accountability for the bureaucrats in these agencies if they
realize that their actions must be justified every few years. So beyond the
immediate fiscal impact, there appears to be evidence of benefits in the form of
greater management of bureaucracies that might otherwise have gone
unsupervised.
With an unknown change in the price of the provision of government
services, simply looking at expenditures alone will not provide a clear picture of
the effect of these laws. It is necessary to add a measure of the quantity of output
in a state. To do this, I use the number of state employees as a proxy for the
quantity of government services.
To begin, I look simply at the average amount of real per capita expenditures
in states with sunset laws verses those that do not (Figure 2). States with sunset
laws spend slightly less than those with sunset laws. This difference is not
statistically significant, so may simply be the result of random variation. I then
break the sunset states into their four subcategories, to look for differences
associated with a particular type of sunset (Figure 3). Regulatory states have the
highest average and discretionary states have the lowest, but again, the
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differences between the states with the four types of sunset and the states
without sunset are small, and lack statistical significance. This simple look at the
data suggests that sunset laws do not have an impact on state expenditures.

MODEL:
In an effort to model what is occurring with Sunset Laws, it is necessary to
first take a closer look at the costs and benefits on each side of the ledger.
The benefits from Sunset come from two possible sources. First there is the
cost savings derived from discontinuing an agency. As described above, this is
non-existent in some states and infrequent in others, there are cases where
agencies are discontinued as a result of a sunset review. If we imagine a state’s
bureaucracy as having a backlog of such ineffective or obsolete agencies, one
should expect that the majority of savings from this channel would be realized in
the first review cycle, where such agencies would be uncovered and
discontinued. While it is certainly possible that existing agencies could be
justifiable in the first review cycle and then later become obsolete, these cases are
certainly likely to be less common than any closures from the first time through.
The second avenue for savings from sunset reviews is savings from the
improved management of resources by bureaucrats who now have to answer to
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a sunset review board. Imagine these boards providing the same oversight
function that a manager provides for her corporation through the process of
annual employee reviews. Individuals whose actions are not periodically
reviewed will be prone to shirking and to costly mismanagement of agency
resources. Just as the manager in a corporate setting provides oversight to try to
minimize this behavior, the sunset review boards provide an opportunity for the
legislature to occupy the same role in overseeing the bureaucrats who run an
agency. Agencies are often consolidated through the sunset review process and
responsibilities shifted from one agency to another if deemed appropriate.
Bureaucrats enter the review cycle understanding that they need to justify their
own existence. The higher the budget for the agency, the higher the expectation
for performance is set. So bureaucrats who might otherwise have few constraints
on their spending now have an incentive to utilize resources more efficiently.
As for costs, the most obvious costs associated with these sunset reviews are
the costs of running the sunset review agency, and the opportunity cost of time
spent by both the bureaucrats and the legislators on the sunset review board.
Both of these costs will be increasing as the number of reviews increase.
Another important concern regarding these sunset reviews is that they “put
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targeted agencies on notice and activated their latent lobbying power.15” These
reviews are open to the public and in fact, they solicit feedback from affected and
interested parties. The traditional sunset review process includes a public
hearing at which public testimony is sought, and many states encourage
members of the public to provide input to the sunset agency staff in their initial
assessment of the agency. The costs associated with lobbying can also be
subdivided. Every sunset review board will face pressure and potential rent
seeking behavior from those who wish to protect their own interest. For
example, a state Haircutters and Hairdressers Licensing Agency will receive
support from its licensed member in an effort to prevent its dissolution.
Additionally, in states where selective or discretionary sunset laws exist, the
decision of whether or not to review an agency provides an additional margin
upon which lobbyists will exert pressure.
Looking at the benefits that should be expected from the different types of
Sunset, we find the following relationships:

Benefits from closures (BCL):

15

Kearney, pg. 50
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Comprehensive review states should get the most benefits here as every
agency undergoes a review during every review cycle. In theory, this will
generate the most reviews and the most closures
Regulatory review states review every regulatory agency, but not every state
agency. As a consequence these states conduct fewer reviews than the
comprehensive states and should expect fewer agencies to be closed as a result.
Selective or Discretionary review states will have fewer reviews than the
comprehensive review states, and could have more or less than the regulatory
states, depending on how selective they actually are. But if the reviews are
conducted strategically – as in agencies whose need is not clearly defined
undergo reviews more frequently than agencies that are clearly not going to be
discontinued (the Department of Education for example) – than it is possible that
they could experience higher benefits from closures than the less strategic
regulatory review states. We would not expect them to have more agency
closures than the comprehensive states, as by definition, the comprehensive
states will review every agency that the selective or discretionary states review.
Therefore,
BCLComp > BCLS/D > BCLREG.
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In looking at the record of various states with respect to closures we typically
see few closures, and what closures do occur tend to occur during the first
review cycle. Table 3 shows the record of the Texas review board and it supports
this belief. The Texas review cycle lasts 12 years. In the first 30 years of sunset in
Texas, 33 agencies have been abolished outright – 23 of those 33 were in the first
12 year cycle.
Including a dummy for years included in the first sunset cycle indicates no
significant difference in expenditures during this period when compared to other
years (Table 7). This is compelling evidence that the gains which arise from
sunset are not primarily driven by agency closures.

Benefits from oversight:
Given that we do not observe frequent agency closings – especially after the
first sunset cycle, yet the utilization of sunset laws is as high today as it has been
since its peak in the early 1980s, the benefits from oversight (BOS) must be
important.
Once again, the states using comprehensive sunset laws will get the greatest
amount of savings from this channel as the behavior of every bureaucrat is
constrained by the specter of an impending sunset review. States with
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regulatory review will receive benefits, but from a subset of their agencies, so
these benefits will be smaller, and states using selective or discretionary review
will typically receive the fewest benefits from this channel, as they tend to review
the fewest agencies. Therefore,
BOSComp > BOSREG > BOSS/D.

Costs from sunset review board staffing and opportunity cost of time
Of course, these benefits do not exist in a vacuum. In order to access the high
level of potential benefits associated with conducting a large number of sunset
review, a state must incur a higher level of costs (CT). The greater the number of
reviews, the higher the cost. Therefore,
CTComp > CTREG > CTS/D

Costs from Lobbying
Lobbying costs (CL) will not be as closely tied to the volume of reviews, as
states with selective or discretionary review create an additional margin upon
which lobbyists can act; the inclusion of an agency in the review process.
Lobbyists can exert influence at this point, as well as in the review process itself.
Therefore,
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CLS/D > CLComp > CLREG.

Table 4 summarizes these relationships.

VARIABLES:
The dependent variables in my regressions are the real level of state
government expenditures (in 2000 dollars16), the real level of state and local
combined expenditures, the log of real state government expenditures and the
number of state employees on the payroll (in full-time equivalents (FTE)).
Explanatory variables include demographic characteristics like income and
population along with the presence of other institutions created to limit
expenditures at the state government level like tax and expenditure limits, lineitem veto power and initiative and referendum. In the details that follow, I will
explain the controls used and their expected signs. The variable of interest are
dummy variables for sunset and the four individual types of sunset programs.
Income – State personal income in billions of real (2000) dollars.
Wagner’s Law, which suggests that government services are a luxury
good (income elasticity of demand greater than 1), would imply that

16

GDP deflator numbers were obtained from Economic History Services (http://eh.net/hmit/gdp)
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demand for government services grows as income grows. This would
yield a positive relationship between income and government
expenditures. The level of wealth in a state is an extremely good predictor
of the level of expenditures within that state. A simple regression of the
level of personal income on the level of state government expenditures
reveals a positive relationship with an r-squared of nearly .95. As a result,
the r-squared values on the main regressions in this paper also very high.
Population –The level of population in a state in a given year.
Previous research suggests that there are economies of scale in the
production of government services, which would generate an inverse
relationship between population and per capita expenditures.
Federal – Federal measures the amount of money received by a state
from the federal government. Abrams and Dougan (1986), Shadbegian
(1996), Holtz-Eakin (1988), Matsusaka (2004) all find a positive correlation
between the level of Federal money available in a state and the level of
state spending independent of the Federal money. The reasoning is that
Federal grants will be a complement to state spending when they come in
the form of a matching grant, where money is pledged in response to
spending at the state level. These expenditures consequently have a lower
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cost, and therefore lower value projects can be justified under these
circumstances. Another possibility is that the Federal money acts as a
substitute for state spending, which would generate a negative coefficient
on this variable.
TEL – A dummy variable indicating the presence of tax and
expenditure limits. Abrams and Dougan find no effect from tax and
expenditure limits. Shadbegian finds a significant decrease in spending
from the presence of tax and expenditure limits, but only when they are
interacted with per capita income, as these limits are often tied to the level
of growth in the state. Besley and Case find that such limits actually
increase spending. Given the mixed results in the literature for tax and
expenditure limits, no prediction is made as to the direction of the change
in spending.
Line Item Veto – A dummy variable indicating that the governor has
the ability to alter the level of spending associated with a bill. Holtz-Eakin
finds that while the balance of power between the governor and the
legislature is altered by the presence of a line-item veto, there is no
significant effect on state level expenditures. Crain and Miller find a
decrease in the growth of state spending when looking at states with item
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reduction power. Abrams and Dougan, Endersby and Towle and Besley
and Case find that line item veto has no effect.
Term Limits – A dummy variable indicating the presence of a term
limitation preventing the governor from seeking reelection after a certain
period in office. Only 1 state (Virginia) allows just a single term, and only
1 state (Utah) allows more than 2 terms, so this is simply an indicator of
the presence of a constraint and does not account for these slight
differences. Dougan and Abrams find that term limits appear to limit
state spending, but only until local spending is added.
Shared budget – A dummy variable with a value of 1 in states where
the budgetary process is shared by the executive and legislative branch.
In these states a budget is prepared by both the governor and the
legislature, as opposed to states where the creation of the budget happens
in the legislature and is presented to the governor. Like the line item veto,
this will affect the balance of power in state government.
Supermajority - A dummy variable indicating supermajority voting
requirements for tax increases. Crain and Miller find a decrease in the
growth in state spending from supermajority tax requirements. After for
correcting for the endogenous selection of these rules by “high-tax
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regimes”, Knight also finds a negative effect on state spending from
supermajority requirements. Besley and Case also find a significant
negative association here.
Initiative and Referendum – A dummy variable indicating the use of
initiative and referendum. Matsusaka finds that the use of initiative and
referendum has a significant negative on state government expenditures.
Over the last 30 years there has only been one change in the use of
initiative and referendum (Rhode Island adopted its use in 1996). As a
result, this variable is dropped from the two-way fixed effects regression,
as insufficient variation exists within the studied time period.
Sunset – A dummy variable indicating the presence of sunset laws in
the state for a given year. If sunset laws are a cost-effective way to reduce
spending in state government, then we would expect a negative sign to
this variable. If the time and money spent on these review is wasteful,
then a positive sign can be expected.
Sunrise – Another development along with sunset laws was the
implementation of “Sunrise” laws. Often agencies that were terminated
one year would be re-instated the following year. Sunrise laws require
that each agency proposed by the legislature must undergo a review to
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justify the cost of its program before it begins operation. This practice
began in Tennessee in 1977 and has since been added in 8 other states.
Sunrise is a dummy variable indicating the presence of sunrise laws in a
state in a given year. Sign may be positive or negative following similar
logic to sunset laws.
Comprehensive – A dummy variable indicating the presence of
comprehensive sunset review. Costs in terms of time spent by both
legislators on the sunset board and the bureaucrats of the reviewed
agency in providing evidence of their effectiveness are highest here, as the
most reviews happen under this regime. Lobbying costs are likely lower
here, as there is no possibility of avoiding the review through effective
lobbying. If savings are generated from the oversight provided by the
sunset review process, it would also be expected to be most effective in
states where all bureaus, agencies and boards are subject to such
oversight.
Regulatory – A dummy variable indicating the presence of sunset
review for all regulatory agencies within a state. Expectations for these
states are similar to those of comprehensive, but on a smaller scale. There
will be lower costs from fewer reviews. Lobbying costs should be
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similarly low, but if benefits are accruing from oversight there is
consequently less potential benefit as fewer programs are subject to this
level of review.
Selective – A dummy variable indicating a state that allows for
selective implementation of sunset reviews. In these states, sunset
reviews are concentrated on entities like occupational licensing and
administrative agencies like highway, health and education
departments.17 The determination of an entity’s sunset status is typically
set upon the statutory creation of that entity. Selective states will undergo
fewer sunset reviews than comprehensive sunset states, so face lower
costs, but generate less oversight. They can generate a similar number of
reviews as regulatory sunset states. The most likely difference between
selective and regulatory is the potential for additional lobbying activity
involving the decision to designate an entity as subject to sunset or not,
and additional costs associated with this behavior.
Discretionary – A dummy variable indicating the presence of sunset
review on a discretionary basis. The sunset review board in these states
has the ability to select which entities will face review. Lobbying costs are

17

Hamm and Robertson, pg. 140

35

consequently highest in these states. The number of reviews conducted is
lower than in comprehensive states, but could be similar to either
regulatory or selective.

RESULTS:
To empirically test the effect of sunset laws on the size of state governments, I
employ 2 different measures of government size. For Models I and II, the
dependent variable is the real level of state and local government expenditures18
and for Models III and IV, the dependent variable is the real level of state
government expenditures (excluding local expenditures). The behavior of states
varies with respect to spending at the state verses the local level. While some
states might require certain spending (like public education) to be included in the
local state budget numbers, others will address this at the state level. Because of
this difference in approach, I felt it appropriate to investigate it from both
perspectives to determine if there were significant changes to my results. Models
I through IV use year fixed effects, but an f-test to determine the appropriateness
of utilizing state fixed effects in addition to the year effects failed to reject the

18

In Year 2000 dollars
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hypothesis that the state effects were statistically different from one another, so
state fixed effects are not employed.
The results I report exclude data from Alaska, as the Alaskan government
receives significant revenues from severance taxes on oil, and consequently their
per capita expenditures are far out of line with per capita expenditure levels in
other states19 for reasons that have nothing to do with their use of sunset laws.
Models I and III treat all sunset programs equally in an attempt to determine
a general effect of sunset laws, while Model II and IV break states with sunset
laws into the their subtypes; comprehensive, regulatory, selective and
discretionary.
In all 4 models, personal income numbers are as expected: the coefficient on
personal income is positive and significant, indicating that government services
are a luxury good. The coefficient on population is negative and significant for
all four models, reflecting economies of scale in the provision of government
services. Federal money appears to be a complement to state spending when
state effects are ignored, as states with higher levels of Federal Funds available to
them also spend more of their own money.

19

For example, Alaska’s per capita expenditures vary from 3 to 31 times that of Alabama.
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Looking to the other constraints on state spending used by the states, like
much of the literature, I also find a mixed bag of results. Tax and expenditure
limits do not appear to have an effect in Models I and II where the state and local
spending is comingled, but once I look only at state level expenditures, these
limits provide a negative coefficient which is significant at the 5% level for Model
III, but remains insignificant in Model IV. Line item veto power is similarly
insignificant in Models I and II, but once the focus turned to state level spending,
there appears to a positive influence on the level of state expenditures. This
result runs contrary to the existing literature, which finds wither no effect or a
slightly negative effect of line item vetoes. Term limits and shared budgetary
power both exert a significant negative influence on state government
expenditures in all four models. Supermajority voting requirements appear to
have a large, positive influence on the level of state and local spending, but this
effect disappears once the local spending is eliminated from consideration.
Following the conclusion of Matsusaka, I find that initiative and referendum
does appear to offer savings at the state level.
Models I and III focus on sunsets as a generic entity, ignoring the differences
of the different programs utilized across the country. Controlling for all of the
above variable, both models indicate a negative impact from the programs, and
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when looking only at state level expenditures, this effect is statistically
significant.
In models II and IV, sunset programs are separated into their subcategories;
comprehensive, regulatory, selective and discretionary. Breaking the sunset
programs down to look at the different types of program allows an examination
of differences based on the different costs and benefits associated with these
different types of reviews. Model II offers some weak evidence that the
comprehensive and selective programs have measurable effects on state
spending levels.
In Model IV, comprehensive, regulatory and selective sunset programs all
appear to offer significant savings at the state level. The question then becomes
is this savings from the closure of agencies or from the oversight that is provided
on an on-going basis. Anecdotal evidence from early sunset investigations and
from the data from the Texas sunset commission appear to indicate that closures
are either rare or they are concentrated in the early years of sunset. Given the
results of Models III and IV, this would imply that the results of sunset come
from ongoing oversight rather than simply from closures.
To test this proposition, I utilize a dummy variable for years that fall within a
state’s first sunset review cycle. The number of years designated as the sunset
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review cycle varies wildly, from as few as four years (Alabama, Delaware, Ohio)
to as many as 15 (Colorado recently expanded the review cycle to 15 years). This
dummy variable is interacted with the sunset indicator in Model V and the four
sunset type indictors in Model VI. If the gains from sunset are from agency
closure, the negative impact of sunset laws should be evident and possibly even
amplified in these years. If the effect decreases or even disappears, this offers
strong evidence for the oversight hypothesis, as this effect would continued into
later cycles, and could possibly even be at its weakest in the first cycle, as the
oversight technically has not even occurred yet (although the threat of oversight
certainly exists at this point). Additionally, we should expect to see no
significant changes to any of the coefficients on the non-sunset independent
variables
Table 7 provides the results. As expected, by concentrating on just the first
sunset cycle, none of the non-sunset coefficients are disturbed in any significant
manner. In Model V, notice that while the coefficient on states with sunset laws
remains negative, the effect is noticeably weaker and it loses its statistical
significance. So the savings of sunset programs in general are not concentrated
in the early clean-up years. In Model VI, the comprehensive sunset programs
continue to offer savings at a comparable rate as in Model IV. Notice the effects
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on the other three vehicles. No measurable effects exist, which is again
consistent with the hypothesis that savings from sunset laws are not closely
associated with agency closures, but rather should be attributed to the increased
oversight and management that these programs offer.
So if sunset laws are offering savings at the state expenditure level the
question then becomes; is this savings from a reduction in the level of
government services, or is it from a decrease in the cost of providing these
services?
The quantity of services provided by the government is certainly a subjective
concept, but in an effect to quantify it, I use the number of employees in state
government (in full-time equivalents (FTE)) as the dependent variable. Given
that states using sunset laws are spending less than the states that are not, if the
savings is coming from a reduction in the level of services, one would expect to
see fewer employees utilized by the state. If the sunset states are benefitting
from efficiency generated from the oversight that sunset provides, then it is
entirely possible that these states would actually be employing more employees
and providing more services20.

The number of additional employees directly associated with providing sunset reviews is likely
trivial, so it is unlikely that the results displayed here reflect increased employment that directly
20
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First a few non-sunset related observations from table 8. Population and
federal funds are both strongly associated with more employees in state
government and this should meet with expectations. Bigger states clearly
require more services, and more federal funds injected into the budget allows for
more state government employees as well. We found earlier that states that use
line item vetoes spend more, and here we see that they also provide more
services. While states with term limits and initiative and referendum may be
achieving their savings through a reduction in the level of services, as reflected in
the significant decrease in the number of employees in these states, all else equal.
As for sunset, the story is not quite as cut and dry. While the coefficient
associated with the number of state employees is positive for sunset states, the
result is not a strong one. Comprehensive and regulatory sunset states offer
lower expenditures with a higher level of services, but there is no clear effect in
terms of the level of services for the selective and discretionary states.
When considering institutions like tax and expenditure limits and
supermajority voting rules along with sunset laws in explaining the level of state
expenditures, there is the possibility of endogeneity in the resulting analysis. If
any of the independent variables used in the above analysis predict the use of
results from sunset programs. Even if it did, given that the expenditures are lower in these states,
this would have to be considered an acceptable cost.
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sunset laws within a given state, then the results may be biased due to this
endogeneity. The following section uses a hazard model to attempt to identify
conditions that make it more likely that a given state will adopt sunset laws.

WHICH STATES CHOOSE SUNSET?
The introduction of sunset laws in 1976 was an innovation, and like any
innovation other firms in the industry will try to adopt this innovation while
simultaneously looking to improve upon the original idea. All innovations have
costs and benefits to their implementation and the more efficiency provided by
an innovation the more rapidly that idea will disperse and be adopted. In the
case of sunset laws, the dispersion was initially very rapid – 28 states adopted
Colorado’s innovation by the next legislative cycle – but was not universal. At its
peak, sunset was used in 36 of the 50 states. The lack of universal acceptance
stems from questions about how much efficiency is gained through sunset when
weighed against the costs and is the subject of the previous chapter. Another
interesting question about this innovation relates to the dispersion of the idea.
Why did some states adopt sunset, while others decided not to? Is it possible to
identify characteristics that make a state more or less likely to adopt a sunset
law?
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The dispersion of ideas has been investigated in a wide variety of disciplines.
Theories on diffusion have their origin in the physical sciences. For a long time,
scientists sought to explain the factors that led to the spread of a biological agent
like a virus. The spread of genetic material has also been carefully studied. From
these origins, diffusion theory has expanded into the social sciences. From the
spread of cultural norms to the spread of innovations, it is widely believed that a
similar mechanism drives the diffusion of all of these things.
The common thread through much of this literature is that of a physical
proximity. To catch a cold, you need to be near the carrier of the virus. There is
an obvious physical component to the spread of genetic materials – it is more
likely to occur with neighboring societies. But also with societies with whom one
might have contact.
Even the spread of ideas (cultural norms, religion, innovation) initially was
dependent on the physical “closeness” of two entities. But with advances in
communication, it is no longer necessary to live in a nearby town to share the
idea/innovation of another. Analyses of the dissemination of ideas, both in
industry and in government, concentrates less on proximity and more on
economic, political and sociodemographic characteristics.
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A few examples:
Economic: Government services are considered to be a luxury good,
and typically the greater the wealth of a state, the higher the demand for
government services in that state. I will initially employ both per capita
income and the level of state expenditures in these regression, but
concerns about multicollinearity will lead me to use just per capita income
for the bulk of the study.
Political: The use of other institutions designed to limit expenditures
at the state level is likely to indicate a high degree of sensitivity to state
government expenditures and one would suspect these states would be
more likely to implement sunset laws. I look at term limits, line item veto,
tax and expenditure limits, supermajority voting requirements and
initiative and referendum. Since several of the tools are used consistently
by individual states over time, the lack of variation in the sample leads to
problems in the analysis and I combine the dummy variables associated
with each of these into a single index. This index simply counts up the
number of different expenditure control measures in existence in a given
state and provides a number from zero to five based on this information.
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Sociodemographic: One only additional demographic variable I use is
population density in an attempt to measure the degree of urbanization in
a given state. Urbanization is often associated with a higher level of
innovation in both private industry and government, so states with higher
population densities are expected to implement an innovation like sunset
laws more quickly. Additionally I look to see if one particular political
party favors the adoption of sunset laws over another. Sunset proponents
promote sunset as a non-partisan measure, so I have no prior belief
regarding which party is more likely to adopt sunset laws. Several studies
have also looked at the implementation of new laws when the legislature
is unified (both house and senate are controlled by the same party),
finding that it is easier for an innovation to be accepted under such
circumstances.
Additionally I look at a measure of proximity. I measure proximity to
sunset laws in two ways – miles between the state’s capital city and capital
city of the nearest sunset state, and the percent of state borders that touch
a sunset state. Given the ease of communication, and vehicles like state
budget officer associations, I do not expect proximity to be a major driver
of the adoption of sunset.
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In this section, I will attempt to identify which characteristics made states
more likely to adopt a sunset program. In this inquiry it will be important to
consider the timing of the decision as well as the decision itself. As indicated
above, numerous states adopted sunset programs in the legislative cycle
following their introduction, while others waited for an additional cycle or two.
After a long period when sunset programs were more likely to be discontinued
than implemented, recent years have produced an increase in the popularity of
sunset laws, and some states have reinstituted retired programs, and a few have
even turned to sunset after more than two decades of deciding against them.

HAZARD RESULTS:
To begin I ran a set of hazard regressions to determine if any of my
explanatory variables were in fact driving the adoption of sunset laws within
particular states. Table 9 offers the first set of results. The dependent variable in
all of the regressions will be a dummy variable on the presence of sunset laws.
Once a state adopts a sunset law, they are not eligible to add sunset in the
following period, so further observations from this state are truncated. Each
model contains a measure of geographic closeness to other sunset states –
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measured as the distance between state capitals.21 As you can see, this initial
approach lacks explanatory power for virtually every variable. Using various
combinations in an attempt to determine if political party or the unity of the
legislature or the legislature and governor fails to uncover a statistically
significant relationship. There is some slight evidence that the presence of sunset
laws in nearby states leads to a higher likelihood of adopting sunset. But given
the lack of explanatory of the rest of these specifications, this relationship must
be taken lightly at this point.
Table 10 contains the same basic regressions, but with expenditures omitted
as they are strongly correlated with per capita income, causing some concern
regarding multicollinearity. The strength of the results improves only
marginally from this change. The presence of term limits has a consistent,
positive impact on the likelihood of adopting sunset, and is significant at the 10%
level in Models 1 and 4. Sunset laws are also more likely to be adopted in
wealthy states.
But there are still collinearity problems stemming from the lack of variation in
the use of many of the other institutions which attempt to control state
government expenditures (term limits, tax and expenditure limits, supermajority
21

These regressions were also run using the percentage of states with shared border which had sunset in
place (following Crain, 1966), but the results were even weaker.
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voting rules, Initiative and referendum). In table 11, I use a single variable for
the presence of such institutions, where the value ranges from zero to five,
representing the number of different institutions used. Since the general
hypothesis for the inclusion of these variables is that a population that has
adopted innovations designed to constrain the spending of the state government
before will be more likely to do so again with sunset, these seems to be a
reasonable approach. The results remain far from robust, with only the
proximity measure yielding any consistent results, again indicating at least a
weak increase in the likelihood of implementing sunset base on what nearby
states are doing.
Shughart and Tollison (1985) use two unique measures regarding the state
legislature as they attempt to explain the dissemination of corporate chartering
laws; legislative size and the ratio of house size to senate size. The size of the
legislature could have two possible effects. First, a large legislature may face a
higher cost to passing laws simply from the simple logistics of working with a
larger body of individuals, meaning that these states would have a lower
likelihood of adopting sunset laws. Conversely, the increase in size also creates
greater opportunity for lobbyist to capture votes at a low cost, leading to an
increase in the adoption of new programs if these programs have an active

49

sponsor, as sunset laws did with Common Cause. A higher ratio of house to
senate members likely increases the cost to special interests in promoting a bill.
If the marginal cost of obtaining votes increases at an increasing rate, the extra
expense of obtaining a large number of votes in a large house outweighs the
savings from the smaller senate body. The wider the disparity, the stronger the
effect is expected to be, decreasing the likelihood of adopting new laws.
Table 12 looks at the adoption of sunset laws using these measures, and while
Shughart and Tollison find that legislative size leads to earlier adoption of
corporate chartering laws and greater house-to-senate ratios do appear to slow
the adoption of these new laws, I am unable to replicate this result for sunset
laws.

CONCLUSION:
Evidence on the effectiveness of the various constitutional and statutory
limitations on state government suggests that these institutions do have effects
on the size of state government. I find that sunset laws also have an effect on the
level of state government expenditures and that it is the intended effect (lower
level of spending) despite the fact that this savings comes from an unexpected
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source (oversight) rather than the wholesale agency closures envisioned by
earlier proponents of these programs.
Sunset laws are only utilized in 30 states. Given the evidence offered above, it
is apparent these programs can lower government expenditures and lower the
cost of providing government services when properly implemented. Proper
implementation means that sunset laws should be implemented more broadly,
either universally across all regulatory agencies or universally across all
programs but not at the discretion of the sunset agency, as this may allow for too
much access for lobbyists who want to keep their program off the sunset docket.
These approaches offer more savings, despite higher costs of
implementation, because the savings from these programs appears to be the
result of increased management and oversight resulting from the auditing
process inherent in sunset reviews. Bureaucrats are employees like any
employee in any corporation. Without supervision, wasteful behaviors will be
undertaken, resulting in higher costs and lower outputs. Corporations long ago
implemented mandatory reviews for all employees in order to attempt to limit
this waste. Sunset laws, properly implemented, afford that same benefit to state
governments.
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Additionally, universal implementation limits access of special interest
groups who will try to protect the agencies that serve their interests by removing
them from the sunset umbrella. Selective or discretionary implementation
provide an additional access point for lobbying activity of this type, leading to
rent seeking behavior that increases costs.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Sunset States – 1981 and 2005
1981 Sunset States
Comprehensive
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Delaware
Indiana
Louisiana
Mississippi
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Texas
Washington
Nebraska
New Hampshire

2005 Sunset States
Comprehensive
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Delaware
Florida
Louisiana
Ohio
Tennessee
Utah
Washington

Regulatory
Alaska
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Montana
New Mexico
North Carolina
Oregon
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont

Selective
Nevada
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
West Virginia
Wyoming

Regulatory
Colorado
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Kentucky
Maryland
Missouri
New Mexico
Pennsylvania

Selective
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Indiana
Maine
Nebraska
Texas
West Virginia
Vermont
Virginia
Oklahoma
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Table A.222: Sunset Principles –
First: The programs or agencies covered under the law should automatically
terminate on a date certain, unless affirmatively recreated by law.
Second: Termination should be periodic (e.g., every 6 or 8 years) in order to
institutionalize the process of reevaluation.
Third: Like all significant innovations, introduction of the Sunset mechanism will
be a learning process and should be phased in gradually, beginning with those
programs to which it seems most applicable.
Fourth: Programs and agencies in the same policy area should be reviewed
simultaneously in order to encourage consolidation and responsible pruning.
Fifth: Consideration by the relevant legislative committees must be preceded by
competent and thorough preliminary studies.
Sixth: Existing bodies (e.g., the executive agencies, General Accounting Offices)
should undertake the preliminary evaluation work, but their evaluation
capacities must be strengthened.
Seventh: Substantial committee reorganization, including adoption of a system of
rotation of committee members, is a prerequisite to effective Sunset oversight.
Eighth: In order to facilitate review, the Sunset proposal should establish general
criteria to guide the review and evaluation process.
Ninth: Safeguards must be built into the Sunset mechanism to guard against
arbitrary termination and to provide for outstanding agency obligations and
displaced personnel.
Tenth: Public participation in the form of public access to information and public
hearings is an essential part of the Sunset process.

22

Adams, Sherman, pg 78-79
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Table A.3 - History of Sunset Commission Action – Texas – 1979 to 2007

Legislative
Session

Agencies
Continued

Agencies
Abolished
Outright

66th – 1979
67th – 1981
68th – 1983
69th – 1985
70th – 1987
71st – 1989
72nd – 1991
73rd – 1993
74th – 1995
75th – 1997
76th – 1999
77th – 2001
78th – 2003
79th – 2005
80th – 2007

12
22
29
24
18
25
23
27
16
19
22
21
23
21
14

8
2
3
6
1
3
3
1
0
0
1
1
1
2
1

Agencies
Abolished
& functions
transferred

Agencies
Consolidated

1
3
0
0
1
3
3
1
2
2
0
0
2
3
1

4
1
0
0
0
1
1
2
0
0
2
1
0
1
0

Agencies
Separated

1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Agencies
Reviewed

26
28
32
31
20
30
30
31
18
21
25
25*
29*
29*
23*

* Some agencies reviewed were not subject to continuation or abolishment or had their Sunset date removed. Also
includes other special reviews and projects.
Source: Sunset Advisory Commission: Guide to the Texas Sunset Process
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Table A.4 – Cost and Benefit breakdown for sunset states
Benefits

Costs

Closure

Oversight

Staff/Time

Lobbying

Comprehensive

High

High

High

Low

Regulatory

Low

Med

Med

Low

Low

Low

High

Selective/Discretionary High to
Med
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Table A.5 – Summary Statistics
Variable
Real State Expenses General Fund (in millions)
Real Per Capita State
Expenses - General Fund
State Employees - FTE
Real State and Local
Expenses (in millions)
Real Personal Income (in
billions)
Population (in thousands)
Real Federal Funds (in
millions)
Tax and Expenditure
Limits
Line Item Veto - Amount
Term Limits
Shared Budget
Supermajority
Sunset
Comprehensive
Regulatory
Selective
Discretionary
Sunrise

Obs

Min

Max

9045.42

326.94

76223.63

1297.43
517.34
1409
588 301714.70 316016.70

435.65
30266

3538.58
1805446

1409

Mean Std. Dev.
7069.90

1323

25278.78

33694.05

1445.61 305598.30

1421
1421

126.50
5195253

154.13
5558492

7.08
411530

1195.90
36000000

1323

4.239

5.525

0.409

49.660

1421
1421
1425
1421
1421
1421
1421
1421
1421
1421
1421

0.410
0.842
0.641
0.152
0.200
0.517
0.177
0.238
0.113
0.011
0.106

0.492
0.365
0.480
0.359
0.400
0.500
0.382
0.426
0.316
0.102
0.308

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table A.6 – Regression results: Real State and Local Expenditures (in millions)
for Model I and II, Real General Fund State Expenditures for Model III and IV
Constant
Personal Income
Population
Federal Funds

Tax and Expenditure Limits
Line Item Veto
Term Limits
Shared Budget
Supermajority
Initiative and Referendum
Sunset

Model I
-3088.592***
(590.391)
152.175***
(7.228)
-1283.133***
(160.474)
3267.737***
(115.42)
100.44
(163.199)
28.527
(155.654)
-704.841***
(190.742)
-978.095***
(268.469)
1051.706***
(232.082)
-3.142
(144.584)
-184.644
(163.52)

Comprehensive
Regulatory
Selective
Discretionary
Sunrise
N
R2

1228.331***
(212.411)
1311
0.993

Model II
-3186.625***
(601.045)
154.701***
(7.385)
-1327.072***
(162.748)
3248.855***
(117.176)
-57.521
(174.319)
129.437
(165.402)
-667.079***
(190.712)
-902.403***
(271.356)
892.912***
(241.035)
65.378
(146.388)

435.227**
(214.916)
-259.044
(160.259)
-669.331**
(301.42)
242.654
(657.11)
1028.65***
(206.056)
1311
0.993

Model III
-107.528
(435.377)
59.595***
(4.046)
-374.150***
(85.808)
297.520***
(74.229)
-211.686**
(104.211)
618.757***
(124.593)
-338.804***
(112.284)
-1132.947***
(196.234)
109.667
(151.246)
-1041.572***
(88.563)
-538.672***
(108.432)

392.599***
(120.863)
1311
.9594

Note: Year fixed effects utilized in each of the four models, but results are not reported here
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Model IV
-102.687
(439.894)
58.552***
(4.126)
-356.493***
(86.102)
308.244***
(75.045)
-171.041
(108.991)
591.540***
(123.656)
-328.542***
(113.328)
-1183.627***
(199.301)
203.079
(165.031)
-1114.028***
(89.155)

-751.069***
(162.977)
-344.300***
(102.029)
-569.057***
(184.121)
256.121
(336.879)
375.8343***
(122.907)
1311
.9596

Table A.7 – Regression results: First Cycle - Real General Fund State
Expenditures
Variable
Constant
Personal Income
Population
Federal Funds
Tax and Expenditure Limits
Line Item Veto
Term Limits
Shared Budget
Supermajority
Initiative and Referendum
Sunset - First Cycle

Model V
-326.07
(438.306)

Model VI
-314.193
(435.983)

59.221***
(4.160)
-370.399***
(88.142)

58.343***
(4.173)
-346.274***
(87.364)

306.215***
(74.751)
-253.741**
(103.631)
659.209***
(129.578)
-402.605***
(113.707)
-1185.681***
(202.419)
67.269
(149.612)
-1027.561***
(88.395)
-216.771
(149.228)

303.744***
(73.630)
-191.71*
(100.466)
675.814***
(130.018)
-418.594***
(110.943)
-1174.426***
(198.708)
116.349
(156.478)
-1056.316***
(88.435)

Comprehensive - First Cycle

-831.752***
(291.004)

Regulatory - First Cycle

1311

112.300
(123.862)
-83.140
(223.504)
-447.889
(418.443)
-125.095
(394.328)
1311

0.959

0.959

Selective - First Cycle
Discretionary - First Cycle
Sunrise - First Cycle
N
R2

Note: Year fixed effects utilized in each of the four models, but results are not reported here
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Table A.8: Regression Results: State Employees (Full-Time Equivalent)
Model VII
16014.324***
(5230.773)
-266.532
(148.175)
47815.176***
(4324.877)
9436.221***
(1370.984)
-2186.168
(3074.503)
14162.268***
(2670.820)
-17759.135***
(5255.725)
12980.277
(5715.106)
-11342.908***
(2827.011)
-14454.027***
(2791.390)
6274.894
(4019.054)

Constant
Personal Income
Population
Federal Funds
TEL
Line Item
Term Limits
Shared Budget
Supermajority
Initiative and Referendum
Sunset
Comprehensive
Regulatory
Selective
Discretionary
Sunrise

2794.765
(3167.832)
490
0.988

N
R2

Model VIII
15891.215***
(5579.654)
-259.641
(151.830)
47709.533***
(4330.439)
9363.959***
(1429.826)
-2572.837
(3154.834)
14307.422***
(2971.282)
-18169.503***
(5168.651)
13659.371
(6372.924)
-12347.115***
(3494.016)
-13871.136***
(2928.924)

8868.143**
(4358.100)
6541.631*
(3929.014)
5763.633
(7197.200)
-324.083
(4844.665)
2244.164
(3012.165)
490
0.877

Note: Year fixed effects utilized in each of the four models, but results are not reported
here
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Table A.9 – Preliminary Hazard regressions. Dependent variable = 1 if year
sunset adopted, 0 if no sunset).
Constant
Tax and Expenditure limits
Term Limits
Line Item Veto
Supermajority
Initiative and Referendum
Real General Expenditures
(in millions)
Real Personal Income per capita
(in thousands)
Republican Senate
Republican House
Republican Governor
Nearest Sunset
Population Density
Hazard term
Republican Legislature
Democratic Legislature

Model 1 Model 2
-3.114
-3.335
(2.245)
(2.288)
-0.929
-0.885
(0.767)
(0.755)
1.076
0.888
(0.666)
(0.626)
-1.824
-1.952
(1.494)
(1.448)
-2.753
-3.275
(3.681)
(4.442)
-1.337
-0.027
(4.827)
(4.754)
0.00000
0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001)
0.271
0.243
(0.349)
(0.301)
-0.761
(0.980)
0.121
(0.899)
-0.291
-0.488
(0.648)
(0.627)
0.00108*
0.00094
(0.00064) (0.00063)
-0.0003 -0.00084
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.914
-1.038*
(0.607)
(0.607)
-0.077
(1.131)
0.566
(0.990)

Unified Legislature

Model 3
-3.244
(2.263)
-0.937
(0.749)
0.838
(0.615)
-1.715
(1.366)
-3.755
(5.174)
3.943
(5.952)
0.00001
(0.00001)
0.080
(0.242)

Model 4
-3.694
(2.355)
-0.860
(0.753)
0.917
(0.627)
-1.718
(1.445)
-2.310
(3.287)
-0.861
(4.038)
0.00000
(0.00001)
0.243
(0.344)

Model 5
-2.899
(2.200)
-0.945
(0.736)
0.811
(0.609)
-1.507
(1.402)
-3.972
(3.781)
3.612
(5.060)
0.00000
(0.00001)
0.066
(0.233)

-0.444
(0.620)
0.00099
(0.00063)
-0.00036
(0.001)
-1.025*
(0.615)

0.189
(0.876)
0.00103
(0.00064)
-0.00097
(0.001)
-0.933
(0.592)

0.00107
(0.00061)
-0.00006
(0.001)
-0.936
(0.595)

0.337
(0.924)

Democratic Legis. and Governor

0.595
(0.962)

NOTE: Because of a lack of variation in some of these variables I was unable to include Republican Legislature and
Governor

62

Table A.10 – Hazard regressions: Alternate Specification - Dependent variable =
1 if year sunset adopted, 0 if no sunset).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant
-3.489
-3.581
-3.577
-3.555
-3.178
(2.176)
(2.214)
(2.198)
(2.291)
(2.124)
Tax and Expenditure limits
-0.881
-0.879
-0.900
-0.882
-0.918
(0.708)
(0.700)
(0.694)
(0.699)
(0.685)
Term Limits
1.176*
0.990
0.988
1.052*
0.935
(0.659)
(0.623)
(0.620)
(0.633)
(0.612)
Line Item Veto
-1.557
-1.682
-1.568
-1.435
-1.362
(1.466)
(1.406)
(1.337)
(1.444)
(1.386)
0.691
0.624
0.620
0.483
Supermajority
(0.788)
(0.778)
(0.760)
(0.778)
0.538
0.633
0.632
0.629
Initiative and Referendum
(0.751)
(0.729)
(0.728)
(0.723)
Real Personal Income per
0.170*
0.188*
0.184*
0.177*
0.148
capita (in thousands)
(0.102)
(0.106)
(0.105)
(0.104)
(0.096)
Republican Senate
-0.560
(0.958)
Republican House
0.243
(0.899)
Republican Governor
-0.343
-0.522
-0.517
-0.198
(0.646)
(0.625)
(0.624)
(0.909)
Nearest Sunset
0.00101
0.00086
0.00086
0.00096
0.00098
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
Population Density
-0.00043 -0.00095 -0.00077 -0.00097 -0.00038
(0.0018)
(0.0018)
(0.0017) (0.00181) (0.00164)
Hazard term
-1.000*
-1.128*
-1.141*
-1.004*
-1.014*
(0.604)
(0.608)
(0.611)
(0.589)
(0.581)
Republican Legislature
0.160
(1.130)
Democratic
Legislature
0.448
(0.984)
Unified Legislature
0.350
(0.927)
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Table A.11 - Hazard regressions: Statutory Limitations Indexed. Dependent
variable = 1 if year sunset adopted, 0 if no sunset).
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant
-4.029** -3.895**
-3.886**
-4.375**
(1.759)
(1.930)
(1.927)
(1.954)
Other Limitations
0.191
0.159
0.168
0.163
(0.252)
(0.244)
(0.244)
(0.244)
Real Personal Income per
0.080
0.110
0.110
0.111
capita (in thousands)
(0.097)
(0.098)
(0.098)
(0.097)
Republican Senate
-0.543
(0.847)
Divided Senate
1.885
(1.590)
Republican House
0.291
(0.802)
Republican Governor
-0.279
-0.422
-0.409
0.027
(0.615)
(0.599)
(0.598)
(0.811)
Nearest Sunset
0.00131* 0.00118* 0.00117*
0.0013*
(0.00069) (0.00068) (0.00068) (0.0007)
Population Density
-0.00046 -0.00076 -0.00059
-0.0011
(0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00172) (0.0018)
Hazard term
-0.839
-0.915
-0.953*
-0.800
(0.583)
(0.581)
(0.575)
(0.573)
Republican Legislature
-0.29
(1.014)
Democratic Legislature
0.031
(0.788)
Unified Legislature
-0.049
(0.760)
Democratic Legis. and Governor
0.385
(0.841)
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Model 5
-3.798**
(1.717)
0.164
(0.243)
0.090
(0.093)

0.00124*
(0.00066)
-0.00043
(0.00168)
-0.905
(0.563)

Table A.12 – Hazard regressions: Considering Size of Legislature and House-Senate
ratio

Variable
Constant

Model 1
-3.435*
(2.120)
0.094
(0.094)
-0.004
(0.009)
0.189
(0.407)
0.00122*
(0.00068)
-0.00068
(0.00193)
-0.898
(0.569)
0.095
(0.277)

Per capita income
(in thousands)
Size of Legislature
House to Senate ratio
Nearest Sunset
Population Density
Hazard function
Other Limitations
Tax and Expenditure limits

Model 2
-2.927
(2.592)
0.204
(0.105)
-0.011
(0.010)
0.367
(0.495)
0.00101
(0.00063)
-0.00046
(0.00217)
-1.102*
(0.599)

-1.708**
(0.853)
0.513
(0.725)
-2.074
(1.603)
0.371
(0.814)
0.806
(0.743)

Term Limits
Line Item Veto
Supermajority
Initiative and Referendum
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Appendix B

Figure B.1: Sunset State Counts, by type
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Figure B.2: Per Capita State spending – Sunset vs No Sunset
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Figure B.3: Per Capita State Spending – By Sunset Type
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